InfoGuard AG (Headquarter)
Lindenstrasse 10
6340 Baar
Switzerland
InfoGuard AG
Stauffacherstrasse 141
3014 Bern
Switzerland
InfoGuard Deutschland GmbH
Frankfurter Straße 233
63263 Neu-Isenburg
Germany
InfoGuard Deutschland GmbH
Landsberger Straße 302
80687 Munich
Germany
InfoGuard Deutschland GmbH
Am Gierath 20A
40885 Ratingen
Germany
InfoGuard GmbH
Kohlmarkt 8-10
1010 Vienna
Austria
A cyberattack can cripple cooling systems, disrupt a hospital’s ventilation, or prevent access to security-sensitive areas of a building. What initially appears to be a technical malfunction can have far-reaching consequences for business operations and people’s safety.
Building management systems (BMS) are no longer isolated entities but rather networked Operational Technology (OT). Heating, ventilation, air conditioning, access control, and other building functions are connected via networks, remote maintenance access points, and interfaces to the corporate IT system. An inventory of the systems and their connections provides the necessary overview.
This connectivity increases efficiency but also expands the attack surface. Cyberattacks can disrupt physical operations and endanger people. Therefore, the availability and integrity of the systems are critical.
Networked cooling systems become an operational risk when attackers manipulate physical processes via remote access or control platforms. Just how real these risks are was demonstrated by a Europe-wide wave of attacks on cooling systems that came to light in France in October 2026 and spread to other European countries in early November.
Attackers remotely manipulated the networked refrigeration systems of several supermarket chains, forcing them into defrost mode. Numerous stores were affected, and some food had to be discarded. The wave of attacks also hit several businesses in Germany and Switzerland. Affected locations included branches of Edeka, Rewe, and Volg, as well as butcher shops in Bavaria and Köniz, Switzerland. As of early November, no comparable incidents had been reported in Austria.
This case illustrates how cyberattacks via networked control systems can impact the physical operations of numerous locations.
On October 13, the German BSI published cybersecurity recommendation BSI-CS 154, “Threats Posed by Internet-Connected OT Systems,” which outlines the following measures:
Prevent direct access from the Internet
Secure necessary access
Keep systems up to date and make these measures routine.
According to the BSI, anyone who makes OT systems accessible from the Internet without adequate protection is “fundamentally in breach of their duties.”
At the same time, regulatory pressure is mounting: The Swiss reporting requirement, NIS2 in the EU, and TRBS 1115 Part 1 (Technical Rules for Operational Safety, Cybersecurity for Safety-Related Measurement, Control, and Regulation Equipment) in Germany are increasingly making cybersecurity for critical components in building technology an operator’s responsibility. IEC 62443 and ISO/IEC 27001 provide important technical and organizational guidance in this regard.
Building OT places special demands on cybersecurity because its systems operate over long periods of time, control physical processes, and in some cases perform safety-critical functions. Traditional IT security measures therefore cannot always be applied as-is.
Five key characteristics are crucial:
Protocols with limited security features: BACnet (Building Automation and Control Networks), KNX (bus system for building automation), Modbus, and LON (Local Operating Network) were developed for closed networks. Security features such as BACnet Secure Connect or KNX Secure are optional and rarely enabled in existing systems.
Long lifecycles: Automation stations operate for significantly longer than IT systems; applying patches requires coordination with the manufacturer and integrator.
Distributed Responsibilities: Planners, installers, integrators, facility management, owners, and IT share responsibility—unclear interfaces are a common cause of security vulnerabilities.
Critical remote maintenance access points: Maintenance access points are necessary for operations but are often left open permanently. Standard passwords are frequently used, and accounts are shared.
Security-critical functions: Smoke extraction, fire control systems, and elevators protect people. A cyberattack here can directly endanger individuals—and this is precisely where TRBS 1115 Part 1 comes into play.
The result: Protective measures must be tailored to the specific system, its level of connectivity, and its operational and safety-critical functions.
Different regulatory requirements apply to networked building systems in the DACH region: In Switzerland, the Information Security Act (ISG) is particularly relevant; in Germany, NIS2 and TRBS 1115 Part 1; and in Austria, the NISG 2026. The location, the type of facility, its regulatory classification, and the systems involved are decisive factors.
Not all building management systems are subject to the same legal obligations. Operators must therefore determine which requirements actually apply to their organization and their systems.
| Country |
Legal Framework |
Implications for Building OT |
|
Switzerland |
Information Security Act (ISG), reporting requirement effective April 1, 2025 |
Operators of critical infrastructure subject to the reporting requirement must report certain cyberattacks to the Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS) within 24 hours. |
|
Germany |
NIS2 Implementation Act (NIS2UmsuCG) effective December 6, 2025
TRBS 1115 Part 1, amended as of January 15, 2026 |
Risk management, reporting, and registration requirements with the BSI for facilities in 18 sectors. The security of building systems critical to operations must be taken into account as part of risk management. Cybersecurity for safety-critical measurement, control, and regulation (MSR) systems, e.g., in elevators or pressure systems; applies regardless of NIS2. |
|
Austria |
Network and Information System Security Act 2026 (NISG 2026), effective October 1, 2026 |
Building systems providers (M&C, elevators, HVAC) for critical infrastructure are also affected by security and reporting obligations as well as supply chain requirements. |
Switzerland does not have a comprehensive equivalent to NIS2. Operators rely on the federal government’s minimum ICT standard, ISO/IEC 27001, and IEC 62443, and, where applicable, TRBS 1115 Part 1 as a reference for the state of the art.
Regardless of specific legal obligations, established security standards provide a technical foundation for the protection of networked building systems.
IEC 62443 describes security requirements for industrial automation and control systems. Its approach, which includes security zones, controlled communication links (conduits), and defined security levels, can also be applied to building OT.
ISO/IEC 27001 establishes the organizational framework for an information security management system (ISMS). For building OT, this must be supplemented with specific requirements regarding system availability, physical processes, and personal safety.
The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) has required manufacturers to submit certain reports since September 11, 2026, and will take full effect on December 11, 2027. As such, it also affects Swiss operators who use components from the EU market.
TRBS 1115 Part 1, “Cybersecurity for Safety-Critical Measurement, Control, and Regulation Systems,” requires operators in Germany to safeguard protective functions against cyber threats throughout the entire lifecycle and to document this in a verifiable manner. It is not binding in Switzerland but can serve as a reference standard.
The scope of application depends on whether a protective function can be compromised via an interface—even a local service port may be sufficient. Since the 2026 amendment, emergency call and emergency command systems, service and programming devices, gateways, and operational M&C systems (M&C = measurement, control, and regulation technology) with potential risks may also be classified as systems requiring protection.
This results in the following core requirements:
Take cyber threats into account in the risk assessment and define appropriate protective measures.
Define responsibilities, access rights, and required expertise.
Ensure the independence of security-relevant functions and avoid negative repercussions from protective measures.
Regularly review the effectiveness of the measures — including after changes are made — identify new vulnerabilities, and document the results.
Effective OT security begins with transparency regarding existing systems, their connections, and their protection needs. Building on this foundation, technical and organizational measures (TOM) can be defined, implemented, and regularly reviewed on a risk-based approach.
The following eight areas of action are based on the requirements of building OT and the protection principles of IEC 62443 and TRBS 1115 Part 1.
Inventory and Protection Needs: Identify automation stations, gateways, remote access points, and service laptops; label systems with protective functions and assess the consequences of a failure or tampering.
Segmentation: Separate the building management system (BMS) from the office and guest networks; create zones based on protection requirements; limit connections to what is necessary. Ideally, monitoring data flows in only one direction, e.g., via a data diode.
Control remote access: Allow access only through a central, logged-in portal with personal accounts, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and operator approval; control systems must never be directly accessible from the Internet.
Hardening: Change default passwords, disable unused services and interfaces, enable available security features, and coordinate patch statuses with the manufacturer.
Independence of security functions: Fire protection and safety control systems must not be unduly influenced by the rest of the IT/OT infrastructure, nor by its failure. Each measure is tested for freedom from unintended effects.
Monitoring: Network monitoring at zone boundaries detects new devices, connections, and configuration changes; logs are stored in a tamper-proof manner and regularly analyzed.
Emergency management: Define how systems can be brought into a secure state even without digital means; close the security gap and clean up the system before restarting.
Organization and Supply Chain: Document responsibilities in writing; include security requirements in requests for proposals and maintenance contracts; train staff.
New construction and renovation projects offer the greatest leverage: What is established during planning and the bidding process does not need to be retrofitted during ongoing operations.
Operators can strengthen the cyber resilience of their building OT with these four initial steps. TRBS 1115 Part 1 underscores the importance of a documented, regularly reviewed security strategy.
Inventory systems with protective functions and all remote access points. Check whether control systems are directly accessible from the Internet.
Define responsibilities among operators, IT, facility management, and service providers.
Conduct a gap analysis against IEC 62443 or TRBS 1115 Part 1.
Develop and test a contingency plan for the failure of the building management system.
Do you want to identify security vulnerabilities in your building management system, review critical remote access points, or develop a risk-based security strategy? Our IoT/OT experts will support you in conducting a security analysis and implementing targeted security measures for your OT environment.
Caption: AI-generated image