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Just imagine: A balmy summer evening, the air conditioning humming in the background. Suddenly, a hacker attackparalyzes central systems and within minutes the supply of electricity to entire regions could come to a standstill.
What sounds like a movie plot has long since become reality. Cyber attacks are now more likely for the energy sector than a power outage caused by a thunderstorm. The industry is at a turning point: with the revision of the Electricity Supply Ordinance (StromVV), the minimum ICT standards will be binding from July 2024. For the gas supply from July 2025, a signal with appeal far beyond the energy sector.
In both the electricity and gas supply sectors, the ICT minimum standards are based on a graduated model with three protection levels (A, B, C). The aim is to create a proportionate but comparable level of security. From large operators with the highest criticality to smaller companies with a manageable risk.
This graduation enables targeted implementation according to criticality and prevents overregulation for smaller companies. At the same time, the comparability of security levels within and between sectors is guaranteed.
However, the levels of protection remain theoretical if they are not translated into everyday life. This is precisely where IT and OT security managers are faced with the question: What does this mean in concrete terms for my company?
In dialogue with IT security managers, familiar pain points and new insights crystallize.
The ICT minimum standards are not a checklist, but require a methodical overall approach:
Interoperability, auditability and integration into existing ISMS and SOC structures are the technical salt in the soup, not a nice-to-have, but a must. The requirements are clear, but how well are companies actually prepared for them today? Gap assessments in accordance with StromVV provide information and show where the biggest gaps are.
"The best time for a gap assessment was yesterday. The second best is today. Act now and turn regulatory obligation into lived safety practice!"
During initial assessments in accordance with StromVV, technical and organizational weaknesses were repeatedly identified.
The most important areas of action at a glance:
1. test backups Backups and recovery processes are the life insurance of every company, but are often underestimated.
Practical example: After a ransomware attack, an energy supplier discovered that although backups existed, they had never been tested. Instead of hours, the restoration took days, with high costs. An annual test run would have massively reduced the damage. Recommendation: At least annual, realistic recovery tests, automated monitoring and regular integrity checks of the backups. |
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2. properly secure external access Maintenance and supplier access is often the weakest link in the security chain.
Practical example: In the event of a network fault, an external service provider used old access data. The access went unnoticed, a potential gateway. With a jump server and session logging, the incident would have been immediately visible. Recommendation: Introduce session logging, restrict access in terms of time and content and consistently use jump servers with MFA. |
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3. strengthen OT security in the machine room Operational technology (OT) requires special attention as it is often not sufficiently integrated into security monitoring.
Practical example: Incorrect measured values suddenly became apparent in a grid control center. Only days later did it emerge that the OT systems were not integrated into the SIEM at all. A passive sensor would have detected the anomaly immediately. Recommendation: Introduce passive sensors, segment networks and use specialized OT vulnerability scanners. |
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4. system hardening as an ongoing task Outdated or missing hardening measures open the door to attackers unnecessarily.
Practical example: A company was the victim of an attack via a standard admin account. A regular comparison with CIS benchmarks would have eliminated the vulnerability at an early stage. Recommendation: Keep policies up to date and regularly compare configurations with recognized benchmarks. |
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5. from a paper exercise to real risk management Effective security management requires concrete analyses, not just abstract risk reports for the boardroom.
Practical example: For a long time, an energy supplier only assessed risks at company level. Only after using a tool for component-specific analysis did it become apparent that a single, outdated firewall represented a significant gateway. Recommendation: Use specialized tools that evaluate threats on an asset basis and break down risk analyses to component level. |
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6. practise contingency plans Contingency plans are worthless if they only exist on paper.
Practical example: During a regional disruption, no one knew who would take over external communications. Although the plan was in place, it had never been practiced. Recommendation: Regularly test crisis plans in realistic exercises and clearly define responsibilities. |
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7. documentation with clear responsibilities Only well-maintained and up-to-date documentation provides traceability and security.
Practical example: During an audit, processes could not be verified because the documentation was out of date. Only an interdisciplinary team brought structure and reliability. Recommendation: Define a team that ensures ongoing governance and documentation. |
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8. keep service providers under control External service providers often take on critical tasks, but without clear rules and control, there is a considerable risk.
Practical example: After a cyber incident, an IT service provider installed important updates late. As no security SLAs had been agreed, the company was unable to react in time or limit the damage. Recommendation: Embed strict security SLAs in contracts, define exit strategies and regularly audit IT service providers. |
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9. blind spots in day-to-day security Basic tasks in particular are often overlooked and develop unnoticed into major risks.
Practical example: A network operator repeatedly experienced disruptions whose causes were not clearly identified. Only after a detailed asset inventory did it become apparent that outdated devices were in use that had never been recorded in the inventory. Recommendation: Establish a complete asset inventory, integrate anomaly detection into monitoring and consistently document and analyze incidents. |
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10. employees as the key to security People are often the gateway, but also the most important line of defense.
Practical example: An employee clicked on a phishing email, but reported it immediately thanks to a clear reporting chain. This allowed the attack to be stopped before any damage was done. Recommendation: Carry out regular, realistic awareness training and establish clear, simple reporting channels. |
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11 Data classification: Only those who know values can protect them Without classification, critical information remains unprotected.
Practical example: A municipal utility discovered that sensitive network data was stored unencrypted on a file server. They were only encrypted and secured with restrictive access rights following a clear classification. Recommendation: Introduce data classification models and consistently restrict access to sensitive data. |
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12. orchestrate crisis communication correctly A lack of coordination in communication can exacerbate the crisis.
Practical example: After an attack, internal and external communications contradicted each other. The uncertainty damaged customer trust. Recommendation: Update communication plans regularly and include all relevant target groups. |
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13. consistently protect privileged accounts Privileged accounts are the crown jewels of any IT environment and are particularly at risk.
Practical example: Attackers compromised an admin account without MFA and gained far-reaching rights. With a PAM solution, access would have been logged and secured. Recommendation: Establish PAM solutions and make MFA mandatory for all administration access. |
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14. consistently manage supply chain risks Cyber risks do not end at the company's borders, but affect the entire supply chain.
Practical example: A cyber incident at an IT service provider led to a domino effect. As there were no security SLAs, the recovery took weeks. Recommendation: Agree strict SLAs, define exit strategies and carry out regular audits. |
For many organizations, especially SMEs, the introduction of a gap assessment according to the ICT minimum standard is challenging. Industry associations such as the VSE therefore provide guidelines and templates that facilitate structured implementation and ensure consistency.
Practical documents such as the LVR-CH 2024 (strom.ch) are helpful. Equally important is early alignment with the NIST CSF 2.0 in order to take future international requirements into account.
These guidelines provide support in
They offer an easy introduction, especially for companies with limited resources, and can be integrated into existing ISMS without major restructuring.
Experience from previous assessments shows that very similar hurdles often arise during implementation.
In these cases,three strategic levers are particularly effective:
The introduction of ICT minimum standards is not just a compliance issue. It is an opportunity to systematically strengthen your own resilience, whether in electricity or gas supply.
The requirements create a clear framework, but it is the practice that makes the difference:
The best time for a gap assessment was yesterday, the second best time is today. Get started today with six essential measures and turn regulatory obligations into lived safety practice.
Cybersecurity never stops - it is a continuous process that challenges and advances organizations on a daily basis. With clear standards, practical tools and a consistently risk-based approach, energy and gas suppliers not only achieve compliance, but also turn resilience and security into a real value proposition for the business.
What makes the difference?
The decisive factor is the interaction between management, IT, OT and external partners - because only together can regulatory obligations become a lived security culture.
Take advantage of the experience of the InfoGuard experts and take the next step: design your cyber strategy at eye level - structured, in partnership and future-proof. Contact us for a no-obligation consultation - together we can transform regulatory requirements into lived cyber security practice.
Caption: Image generated with AI